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STUDENT INTERROGATIONS BY SCHOOL 
OFFICIALS: OUT WITH AGENCY LAW AND 
IN WITH CONSTITUTIONAL WARNINGS 
Eleftheria Keans* 
Abstract: When public school students admit to violating of school rules 
to their principals, they may also be admitting to a violation of criminal 
law. Increasingly, principals share these confessions with local law en-
forcement and the students are charged in a criminal proceeding. Be-
cause principals, knowing the evidence will be turned over to law en-
forcement per school policies, are seeking evidence to use against their 
students, these students should be so warned before an interrogation with 
their principal. Though most prior case law involving student interroga-
tions has been decided under agency law, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Ferguson v. City of Charleston suggests a new framework to analyze stu-
dent interrogations by school officials. Ferguson dealt with a Fourth 
Amendment search, but suggested the same analysis would be applicable 
in Fifth Amendment cases. Because Fourth Amendment school cases of-
ten value the same factors as in the Ferguson analysis, Ferguson’s test, which 
requires constitutional warnings when state actors seek out incriminating 
evidence, should also be applied in Fifth Amendment school cases. 
Introduction 
 Imagine you are a public high school student who has brought 
marijuana to school. You sell some of the drugs to a fellow student, who 
is caught with them and gives the principal your name as her source.1 
The principal takes the confiscated marijuana to the local police de-
partment and informs the police that, upon her return to school, she is 
planning to question you.2 The principal calls you to her office, ex-
plains to you that she has reason to believe you are carrying drugs, and 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2006–2007). Thanks 
to my mom for showing me the importance of social justice and action, and to all my stu-
dents from Marshall Fundamental Secondary School (Pasadena, California) for the many, 
many lessons they taught me. 
1 See generally State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580 (N.H. 1998). All of the facts in this Intro-
duction come from Tinkham. See id. at 580, 581, 582. 
2 See id. at 581. 
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asks you to empty your book bag.3 You comply.4 The principal finds a 
small wooden container with a peculiar odor, which she seizes and ex-
plains will be turned over to the police.5 After this search, the principal 
tells you that another student has implicated you as selling drugs in the 
school parking lot which you confirm.6 You fill out a student-referral 
form to give your version of events.7 After doing so, the principal in-
forms you that you will be suspended for five days and that further ac-
tion will likely be taken against you.8 Then the principal contacts the 
police, tells them about the suspicious item she confiscated as well as 
the details of her conversation with you, and gives them your written 
confession.9 
 Eventually, you are charged with selling marijuana to another stu-
dent on school property.10 At your trial, you move to suppress the 
wooden container and the student-referral form.11 You claim the 
search that revealed the wooden item was unconstitutional and that 
your version of events (essentially, a confession) on the student-referral 
form was given without Miranda warnings.12 Unfortunately, the law on 
school searches is well-established; courts only require that searches by 
school officials be reasonable under the circumstances, so the motion is 
denied and the ruling is later affirmed on appeal.13 
 You might think, however, that your argument for the suppression 
of your statement has a good chance of success. After all, the principal 
had already given the police potentially incriminating evidence and 
informed them that she was going to question you, specifically.14 From 
her statements to you and to the police, it was clear that the principal 
had every intention of turning any further evidence over to the po-
lice.15 You have watched enough television to know that anything you 
say to the police “can and will be used against you in a court of law,” but 
                                                                                                                      
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. at 582. 
6 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
7 See id. at 582. A student-referral form is used when disciplinary action is taken against 
a student and provides space for both the student and administrator to explain their ver-
sions of the events at issue. See id. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 582. 
11 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
12 See id. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
13 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985); Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 584. 
14 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
15 See id. 
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you were talking (and confessing) to your principal—not a police offi-
cer.16 You knew you might be punished for violating school rules, but 
you never considered that anything you told your principal might be 
used against you in a criminal situation.17 Indeed, if you had, perhaps 
you would not have admitted anything or filled out a student-referral 
form without first speaking to a lawyer, such as the kind police on tele-
vision shows always offer suspects when reciting Miranda rights.18 Un-
fortunately for you, however, school officials do not have to give stu-
dents any type of Miranda warnings before they conduct interrogations, 
even if they have every intention of turning over evidence to the police, 
just as your principal had.19 As a result, your motion is denied and the 
denial is upheld on appeal.20 
 Lest you think you just happened to be in an unfriendly jurisdic-
tion, you should know that many jurisdictions have similarly ruled that 
school officials do not need to give Miranda warnings before question-
ing students.21 Courts have ruled this way based on two lines of reason-
ing. First, because school officials are not law enforcement officers and 
do not have the same objective or purpose as law enforcement officers, 
they are not per se required to give Miranda warnings.22 Second, if 
school officials are acting as agents of law enforcement at the time of 
the interrogation, courts will only require Miranda warnings in specific 
situations.23 This basis of analysis is somewhat misleading, however, be-
cause courts rarely find that such an agency relationship exists.24 
 Without dispute, school officials and society have an important 
and legitimate interest in preventing drug distribution, or any crime for 
that matter, on school property.25 And, as the Supreme Court and many 
state courts have found, school officials should have more latitude than 
                                                                                                                      
16 See id. at 581–82. 
17 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
18 See id. 
19 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 584. 
20 See id. 
21 See, e.g., In re Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV91000058, 901 P.2d 1247 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1995); In re Corey L., 203 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Commonwealth v. 
Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1992); State v. Biancamano, 666 A.2d 199 (N.J. Super. A.D. 
1995); In re Brendan H., 372 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Fam. Ct. 1975); In re Drolshagen, 310 S.E.2d at 
927 (S.C. 1984). 
22 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 583. 
23 See id. at 583–84. 
24 See id.; see also Navajo Co. Juvenile Act. No. JV91000058, 901 P.2d at 1249; Snyder, 597 
N.E.2d at 1369; Brendan H., 372 N.Y.S.2d at 477. 
25 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985). 
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law enforcement officers when investigating offenses on school prop-
erty because of the unique nature of public schools.26 School officials 
have a “custodial and tutelary responsibility” for their students, and are 
responsible for maintaining a safe and orderly environment that is 
conducive to learning.27 Because of this responsibility, school officials 
are necessarily allowed to closely supervise their students and enforce 
rules that would be unenforceable against adults, or even minors out-
side of the school setting.28 At the same time, however, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ferguson v. City of Charleston reveals that the Court is 
wary of non-law enforcement actors seeking out evidence with a pri-
mary objective of turning that evidence over to law enforcement.29 
Looking back to the real-life facts that introduced this Note, what was 
the principal’s intent? Although she certainly intended to keep her 
campus drug free, she also had a clear intent to turn any evidence over 
to law enforcement.30 Because of her goal to assist law enforcement, the 
principal should have given the student the appropriate constitutional 
warning under the reasoning of Ferguson.31 
 This Note takes a fresh look at school interrogations after the Fer-
guson decision, exploring how that case should change the area of in-
terrogations by school officials. The Note concludes that the Ferguson 
decision provides the proper framework for analyzing school interroga-
tions and that the decision requires school officials to give constitu-
tional warnings in some school-based interrogations. Part I examines 
the Ferguson decision and its resulting test. Part II argues that the Fergu-
son decision should be applied in the school context based on other 
Supreme Court decisions about school-based constitutional rights. Part 
III provides external support for applying the Ferguson decision in 
school interrogation cases based upon the close relationship between 
school officials and law enforcement, as evidenced by crime reporting 
statistics and school policies. Part IV addresses some concerns applica-
tion of the Ferguson test could have on the practicalities of school offi-
cials should they be required to provide constitutional warnings in stu-
dent-interrogations. 
                                                                                                                      
26 See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002); Verno-
nia, 515 U.S. at 655; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 582. 
27 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. 
28 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. 
29 See 532 U.S. 67, 83, 85 (2001). 
30 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
31 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
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I. Ferguson and Its Aftermath 
A. Introduction to Ferguson 
 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, state hospital workers administered 
drug tests to pregnant women without the women’s consent.32 The test-
ing was implemented after hospital staff became concerned about a 
perceived increase in the number of pregnant women using drugs.33 If 
a woman received a positive test result, she would be referred to a drug 
treatment program with the county substances abuse commission.34 
During the time of the testing, there was no noticeable decline in the 
number of pregnant women testing positive.35 Then, a nurse at the 
hospital heard a news report that police would arrest pregnant drug 
users and informed the hospital’s general counsel, who in turn con-
tacted the Charleston Solicitor, to offer the hospital’s assistance in any 
future criminal actions the police might be taking against pregnant 
drug users.36 The Solicitor set up a task force, consisting of representa-
tives of law enforcement, the hospital, the County Substance Abuse 
Commission, and the Department of Social Services.37 The task force 
produced a twelve-page policy manual, “POLICY M-7,” which explained 
the new policy entitled “Management of Drug Abuse During Preg-
nancy.”38 The policy outlined the hospital’s role in identifying patients 
suspected of drug use, the chain of custody that should be used for the 
urine samples used to test for drug use, the referral process for those 
women that tested positive to place them in a substance abuse clinic, 
and the threat of criminal prosecution and sanctions to “provide[] the 
necessary ‘leverage’ to make the policy effective.”39 
 The Supreme Court ruled that “POLICY M-7” violated the preg-
nant women’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from nonconsen-
sual, warrantless, and suspicionless searches.40 First, the Court found 
that because the hospital was a state hospital, its employees were gov-
ernmental actors and therefore limited by the Fourth Amendment.41 
                                                                                                                      
32 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 70. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 70, 71. 
37 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69, 71. 
38 Id. at 71. 
39 Id. at 72. 
40 Id. at 86. 
41 Id. at 76. 
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Next, the Court found that a urine test was a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.42 Finally, the Court applied a search balancing 
test, weighing the privacy intrusion against the governmental interest in 
preventing drug use among pregnant women, and ruled in favor of the 
women.43 
 In the first part of the balancing test, the Court found that the de-
gree of invasion of privacy was quite substantial because the test results 
were turned over to a third-party.44 The Court compared and distin-
guished the drug testing regime in Ferguson to four prior drug testing 
cases it had considered.45 The distinguishing factor in Ferguson was that 
the hospital staff had turned over test results to law enforcement, a 
third-party, for criminal sanctions.46 In Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 
the Court found that drug tests for U.S. Customs Service employees 
seeking promotion to certain high-level positions were constitutional, 
and in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (discussed later in depth), the 
Court held that requiring public high school athletes to submit to drug 
testing in order to participate on a school sports team was constitu-
tional.47 Neither in Von Raab nor Vernonia were the results of the drug 
tests turned over to law enforcement.48 Therefore, using test results 
within an organization solely to deny a promotion or participation in 
extracurricular athletics is a lesser privacy intrusion than when test re-
sults are given to law enforcement for criminal sanctions.49 The Fergu-
son decision made a distinction between internal (within job or within 
school) sanctions and external (criminal justice) sanctions.50 Further-
more, in the prior drug testing cases, there were protections to ensure 
that the test results were not revealed to third-parties, including law en-
forcement.51 In comparison, not only did the Ferguson policy not pro-
vide protections against test results being revealed to third-parties, part 
                                                                                                                      
42 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76. 
43 See id. at 69, 78, 86. 
44 See id. at 78. 
45 See id. at 77, 78. 
46 See id. 
47 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 
(1995); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989). 
48 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665–66. 
49 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69, 77, 78. 
50 See id. at 72, 78. 
51 See id. at 80 n.16. For example, in Von Raab, test results were not used in a criminal 
prosecution of the employee without the employee’s consent, and, in Vernonia, test results 
were disclosed to a limited number of school personnel “who have a need to know” and 
not turned over to law enforcement. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 
665–66. 
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of the policy intended to actively turn the results over to law enforce-
ment.52 
 The prior cases were further distinguished by looking at the gov-
ernmental interest in the testing program.53 In the prior cases, a clear 
distinction existed between the governmental interest in the specific 
testing regime and a general governmental interest in law enforcement 
of drug laws.54 For example, in Vernonia, a clear governmental interest 
in deterring drug use among student-athletes existed, separate from 
any potential law enforcement interest in punishing student-athletes for 
drug use.55 Similarly, in Von Raab, the government had a clear interest 
in not promoting an employee who used drugs to a sensitive high-level 
government position, divorced from a general interest in pursuing a 
criminal prosecution of an employee who tested positive.56 Addition-
ally, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, the government tested 
federal railroad employees for drug use “not to assist in the prosecution 
of [those] employees, but rather to ‘prevent accidents,’” which again 
reflects the independence of the governmental interest in testing from 
the law enforcement interest in enforcing drug laws.57 
 By contrast, in Ferguson, the primary governmental interest was the 
use of law enforcement to coerce patients into treatment; thus, this 
governmental interest was indistinguishable from a general interest in 
law enforcement.58 The policy itself blurred the line between a gov-
ernmental interest in ending drug use among pregnant women and a 
governmental interest in drug law enforcement, as it included very 
specific information about the chain of custody of test results, possible 
criminal sanctions for violations of the policy, and the logistics of police 
notification and arrest of women who tested positive.59 Additionally, the 
city attorney and local police were involved at every stage of the crea-
                                                                                                                      
52 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 72. 
53 See id. at 79, 80. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 69, 80 n.16; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658. The Court was concerned about the 
risk of “immediate physical harm” to student athletes (and their opponents) who used 
drugs while participating in school sports. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662. 
56 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80 n.16; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665–66. 
57 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80 n.16; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 620–21 (1989). The fourth prior drug testing case, Chandler v. Miller, examined re-
quired drug tests of candidates running for certain state offices, a testing program the 
court found to be unreasonable and unconstitutional. 520 U.S. 305, 312 (1997). 
58 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80. 
59 See id. at 82. In fact, one of the lower court judges wrote, “[I]t . . . is clear from the 
record that an initial and continuing focus of the policy was on the arrest and prosecution 
of drug-abusing mothers.” See id. 
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tion and implementation of the policy, even when determining the cri-
teria for which pregnant women would be tested.60 These factors only 
emphasized that neither the hospital staff nor the government’s inter-
est in the testing program was primarily motivated by a medical con-
cern for the detection and treatment of drug use among pregnant 
women, but instead revealed that the primary interest was to locate and 
secure evidence against potential criminal defendants.61 Although the 
ultimate goal may have been to help pregnant drug users stop using, 
the “immediate objective . . . was to generate evidence for law enforce-
ment purposes.”62 This was a crucial distinction because law enforce-
ment always serves a greater goal; thus, the Court reasoned that if this 
testing regime were constitutional, then any non-consensual, suspi-
cionless search would also be constitutional because there could always 
be a purported non-law enforcement “ultimate” goal.63 
 Finally, the Court analyzed the immediate objective of the testing, 
and found a critical distinction between happening upon evidence and 
seeking out evidence.64 The hospital employees, like any private citizen, 
might inadvertently acquire evidence in the course of routine conduct 
(or routine prenatal treatment) and choose to turn that evidence over 
to police.65 This is significantly different from the situation in Ferguson, 
where hospital employees sought out evidence “for the specific purpose 
of incriminating” their patients and coercing them into treatment.66 
Because of this distinction, the Court reasoned that when non-law en-
forcement actors seek out incriminating evidence, they have a “special 
                                                                                                                      
60 See id. 
61 See id. at 82–84. 
62 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69, 82, 83, 84. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 84–85. 
65 See id. Compare this with United States v. Chukwubike, 956 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 
1992), where a doctor extracted balloons from a patient, tested them, found they were 
filled with heroin, and later turned the test results over to police. The doctor performed 
surgery to remove the balloons and tested them for medical reasons, including to deter-
mine what substances might have leaked into the patient in order to provide proper 
treatment. See id. at 212. The doctor later chose to turn the balloons and the test results 
over to police. See id. at 211. Here, the doctor performed the surgery and tests as a part of 
necessary treatment for a potential overdose and later chose to turn over the evidence to 
police, unlike in Ferguson where the drug tests, performed for a nominal medical reason, 
were conducted primarily to collect evidence to turn over to police. See id. at 212. 
66 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 80, 85. In fact, some of the hospital staff questioned their 
role of acting like law enforcement officers in the policy. See id. at 85 n.24. Though they 
noted that medical personnel might legally or ethically be required to report some crimi-
nal activity to law enforcement, the staff still questioned the propriety of the “active pursuit 
of evidence to be used against individuals presenting for medical care.” See id. 
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obligation” to make sure the subjects of the purposeful evidence collec-
tion are “fully informed about their constitutional rights, as standards 
of knowing waiver require.”67 This conclusion—that non-law enforce-
ment actors, when seeking out evidence, should give constitutional 
warnings—was a radical departure from previous jurisprudence on who 
must give constitutional warnings and in which situations these warn-
ings must be provided.68 Thus, the Ferguson decision has important 
ramifications in areas other than drug testing cases, such as in Fifth 
Amendment school interrogation cases where school officials seek out 
evidence (often, written confessions) from their students.69 
B. The Ferguson Test 
 The Ferguson analysis produced the following workable test: when 
non-law enforcement actors are collecting evidence with the intent to 
assist law enforcement, constitutional rights are implicated and consti-
tutional warnings are necessary to prevent any violations of these 
rights.70 To help determine the intent of the actor, courts consider two 
factors: whether the evidence collected is turned over to police for 
criminal sanctions or only used for internal sanctions, and whether the 
actors had a general crime control motive when they acted (an ultimate 
or immediate goal analysis).71 
C. Ferguson and Agency Law 
 The Court reached its decision in Ferguson by applying a balancing 
test, just as in the prior drug testing cases decided by the Supreme 
Court.72 In doing so, the Court retained intact the balancing test crite-
                                                                                                                      
67 See id. 
68 See id. at 85; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Commonwealth v. 
Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992); State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580, 581 
(N.H. 1998). Generally, private citizens are not required to give Miranda warnings, nor 
adhere to other constitutional limitations. See United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 930–31 
(9th Cir. 1994). All state actors are bound by constitutional protections, and the category 
of state actors includes the state hospital workers in Ferguson, public school employees, 
OSHA inspectors, and building inspectors. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 
76 (2001); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985). 
69 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 
1363, 1369; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
70 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83–85. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 78; see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
822 (2002); Vernonia v. Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); Treasury Employ-
ees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 663 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602, 621 (1989). 
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ria, but also considered other factors, such as the separation (or lack 
thereof) of the governmental interests in the testing program and in 
general crime control and the intent and motive of the testers, both of 
which were important factors in the prior cases.73 The Court’s consid-
eration of additional factors in Ferguson may lead to a wider application 
of the Ferguson test than if that case had been decided under agency 
law.74 Generally, constitutional protections (such as the Fourth Amend-
ment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches or the Fifth Amendment’s 
prohibition of compelled self-incriminating statements) only mitigate 
governmental intrusions, not intrusions by private individuals.75 The 
exception is when private individuals act as instruments or agents of the 
government, and, if they act as such, even private individuals are con-
strained by constitutional mandates.76 To determine whether a private 
individual is an agent that must adhere to constitutional requirements, 
courts look to two factors: (1) whether the government knew of and 
acquiesced to the intrusive conduct and (2) whether the private party 
performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts as 
opposed to inadvertently assisting law enforcement while furthering his 
or her own ends and goals.77 Ferguson could have been an easy case in 
which an agency relationship was found between the hospital staff and 
law enforcement based on existing agency law without expanding agency 
law analysis.78 
 Though the lower court found an agency relationship between a 
hotel manager who intended to assist law enforcement in a drug inves-
tigation, the Court could have found an agency relationship between 
the hospital staff and law enforcement, based upon the hospital staff’s 
intent to seek out evidence against patients.79 In United States v. Reed, the 
court found an agency relationship between a hotel assistant manager 
and local police.80 The hotel worker contacted police about a guest 
who he believed was using the hotel to sell drugs, and asked that a po-
                                                                                                                      
73 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 822; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; 
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 663. 
74 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77–78; United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gomez, 
614 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1979). 
75 See Reed, 15 F.3d at 930–31. 
76 See id. at 931. 
77 See id. 
78 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79, 82. 
79 See id. at 82; Reed, 15 F.3d at 931. As of yet, there have been no reported cases testing 
agency law in Fifth Amendment, Miranda-interrogation cases. See Reed, 15 F.3d at 933; 
Walther, 652 F.2d at 791; Gomez, 614 F.2d at 645. 
80 See 15 F.3d at 930, 933. 
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lice officer come to the hotel while the manager checked the room.81 
Accompanied by two police officers, the manager entered the room 
and began looking around, even opening drawers and a latched brief-
case.82 The first prong of the agency test was easily met because the of-
ficers knew of and acquiesced to the search; they were present during 
the search, did nothing to discourage the search of the room occu-
pant’s personal belongings beyond what was required to protect hotel 
property, and were in the role of lookout rather than incidental by-
stander.83 The lower court held that the second prong was met because 
the manager did not have a legitimate motive for the search “other than 
crime prevention.”84 This was shown by the manager’s continued search 
of the room even after he had established that the room was in good 
condition, which was his alleged motive for entering the room.85 Be-
cause, however, there was no need to open drawers or the briefcase to 
ensure there was no damage to hotel property, the court concluded 
that the manager had intended to assist law enforcement and that the 
proffered reason of protecting hotel property was only a pretext to en-
ter the room to search for drugs.86 Furthermore, the court noted that 
the manager’s motivation of general crime prevention was not a legiti-
mate, independent motivation and thus could not be saved from meet-
ing the second prong by offering crime prevention as his purpose.87 
 By contrast, in United States v. Gomez, when an airline employee 
opened a suitcase in the presence of police officers and found drugs, 
there was not an agency relationship because the airline employee 
acted to further airline policy, not to assist law enforcement, even 
though the police officers knew of and acquiesced to the search.88 A 
police officer noticed a suitcase, without any identification information 
on it, that had fallen off the luggage conveyor belt.89 The officer noti-
fied the airline’s supervisor who took the suitcase into a back room, 
accompanied by two police officers, and proceeded to open the suit-
case to identify the owner.90 When the supervisor had trouble opening 
the suitcase, one of the officers assisted him by tapping the lock, which 
                                                                                                                      
81 See id. at 930. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. at 931. 
84 See id. at 932. 
85 See Reed, 15 F.3d at 931, 932. 
86 See id. at 933. 
87 See id. at 932. 
88 See 614 F.2d 643, 644–45 (9th Cir. 1979). 
89 See id. at 644. 
90 See id. 
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caused it to open.91 The supervisor continued opening the suitcase and 
saw a gun, at which point he turned the suitcase over to the police who 
were standing with him.92 The police continued to search the suitcase 
and found cocaine.93 Although the first prong of the agency test was 
met because the police officers knew of the search and even assisted in 
the search by helping unlock the suitcase, the second prong was not 
met.94 The airline supervisor’s motive for opening the suitcase was to 
further his company’s policy of attempting to reunite lost luggage with 
its owner, rather than to assist law enforcement.95 Thus, the airline em-
ployee’s legitimate, independent motivation for the search saved the 
action from becoming a governmental search by an agent.96 
 Applying the agency test to the facts of Ferguson, the Court easily 
could have found an agency relationship.97 First, the government knew 
of and acquiesced to the search (drug tests) because they had helped 
to formulate and implement the drug testing policy, thus meeting the 
first prong of the agency test.98 The Solicitor and police were “perva-
sively” involved at every stage of the testing program, from determining 
which women would be tested to coordinating arrests of women who 
tested positive.99 Second, the Court found that members of the hospital 
staff intended to assist law enforcement by administering the tests, 
rather than conducting the tests for their own purposes of detecting 
and ending drug use among pregnant women.100 The Court compared 
the hospital staff’s ultimate and immediate objectives and found that, 
although helping pregnant drug users was an ultimate (and worthy) 
goal, the immediate goal of the hospital staff was to obtain evidence of 
criminal conduct to turn over to police.101 So, while there was a prof-
fered legitimate motive for the search, it was not an independent moti-
vation to “further [the hospital’s] own ends,” and thus satisfying the 
second prong of the agency test.102 
                                                                                                                      
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See Gomez, 614 F.2d at 645. 
94 See id. 
95 See id. 
96 See United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981); Gomez, 614 F.2d at 645. 
97 See United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1994); Walther, 652 F.2d at 792; 
Gomez, 614 F.2d at 645. 
98 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001); Reed, 15 F.3d at 931. 
99 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82, 85. 
100 See id. at 82–83; Reed, 15 F.3d at 931, 932. 
101 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82–84. 
102 See id. at 83–85; Reed, 15 F.3d at 931. 
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 Therefore, if Ferguson had been evaluated under agency law, the 
hospital staff likely would have been found to have acted as agents of 
law enforcement.103 If the court found an agency relationship, then the 
hospital staff would have to adhere to the same constitutional mandates 
as law enforcement in a criminal search situation.104 Therefore, the 
hospital staff in Ferguson would have needed to obtain warrants before 
conducting the drug tests and would have had to give constitutional 
warnings, the same conclusion the Court reached (though using a dif-
ferent analysis).105 A decision on the basis of agency law would have 
significantly limited the impact of the Ferguson decision.106 As shown, if 
Ferguson had been decided using agency law, there would be no exten-
sion of current jurisprudence on school-based interrogations by school 
officials because the facts of Ferguson can easily be shown to meet the 
two prongs of the agency test.107 Instead, however, the actual Ferguson 
decision has left the case and its test applicable in a wider array of situa-
tions than had the decision been based on agency law.108 The Ferguson 
decision focused on whether non-law enforcement actors intended to 
assist law enforcement by collecting evidence, considering both 
whether the collected evidence was turned over (or whether the party 
intended to turn it over) to police and what the actors’ motivation was 
(general crime control or not).109 Put differently, the Ferguson rule is 
essentially only the second prong of the agency test, along with guid-
ance as to how to determine the actor’s motive.110 
 However, nothing in Ferguson suggests that the Court was formulat-
ing a new test for agency consisting of only the second prong; in fact, 
the decision does not even mention agency law or consider whether the 
hospital staff acted as agents when it conducted the drug tests.111 This is 
significant because most school interrogation cases are analyzed using 
agency law.112 Almost without exception, when a student-defendant 
tries to suppress a statement made to a school official (usually a princi-
pal or vice principal) that was later turned over to law enforcement and 
                                                                                                                      
103 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83–85; Reed, 15 F.3d at 932, 933. 
104 See Reed, 15 F.3d at 932–33. 
105 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Reed, 15 F.3d at 933. 
106 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Reed, 15 F.3d at 933. 
107 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83–85; Reed, 15 F.3d at 932–33. 
108 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Reed, 15. F.3d at 934; United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 
788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gomez, 614 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1979). 
109 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83–86. 
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112 See cases cited supra note 21. 
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used against the student in a criminal proceeding, courts use agency 
law to determine whether the school official was required to give 
Miranda rights before the interrogation.113 In these analyses, courts 
have found that, at the time of the interrogation, school officials were 
not acting as agents of police because the police either did not know or 
acquiesce to the conduct (failing to meet the first prong) or because 
the school officials acted to further their own ends (failing to meet the 
second prong).114 
 If Ferguson had relied upon agency law, the decision would not im-
pact school interrogation cases because it would have only reinforced 
the two-prong test to determine agency, and school officials will almost 
always be able to claim a non-law enforcement ultimate objective, such 
as maintaining school discipline and safety.115 But Ferguson approached 
the issue differently by focusing primarily upon the intent of the actor 
and considering such factors as whether any evidence obtained was 
turned over to law enforcement and whether that evidence was hap-
pened upon or sought out.116 The Ferguson test makes a more nuanced 
distinction than agency law in determining if the actor was intending to 
assist law enforcement or only intending to further her own legitimate, 
independent motives.117 Because of this more refined analysis, situations 
that would have failed the agency test may meet the Ferguson test.118 Spe-
cifically, the Ferguson test is much more likely to be triggered in school 
interrogation cases, and thus will require constitutional warnings—even 
when a school official is conducting the interrogation.119 The Ferguson 
test is more easily triggered than agency law in school interrogation 
cases because of Ferguson’s consideration of how evidence was obtained, 
what will happen to that evidence, and the ultimate/immediate goal 
analysis, all of which cut in student-defendants’ favor.120 
                                                                                                                      
113 See, e.g., In re Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV91000058, 901 P.2d 1247, 1249 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992); State 
v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580, 584 (N.H. 1998). 
114 See Navajo, 901 P.2d at 1249; Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1369; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 583–
84; State v. Biancamano, 666 A.2d 199, 202–03 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
115 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86; Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1369; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 583–
84; Biancamano, 666 A.2d at 202–03. 
116 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84, 85, 86. 
117 See id. at 84–85; United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981). 
118 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84–85. 
119 See id.; Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1368; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 584. 
120 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84–85. 
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II. Why the Ferguson Test, Not Agency Law, Is the Proper Test 
in School Interrogation Cases 
 Although the Ferguson case itself would likely have come out the 
same way if decided under agency law, many school interrogation cases 
would likely not be decided the same under the Ferguson test (a topic 
which is explored more below).121 But before getting to that analysis, 
the threshold question is: why should school interrogation cases be ana-
lyzed under the Ferguson test and factors instead of being analyzed un-
der agency law?122 The answer is that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
school cases addressing other constitutional rights, such as Fourth 
Amendment searches, are remarkably similar to the Ferguson reason-
ing.123 Though Ferguson dealt with an unconstitutional search, the case 
itself suggests that it is not limited to only Fourth Amendment con-
cerns, but with all constitutional rights, thus encompassing the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment protections at issue in school interrogation 
cases.124 Consequently, if Fourth Amendment-school drug testing cases 
follow similar analyses as Ferguson and that case extends to other consti-
tutional rights, then the Ferguson test is the appropriate framework in 
Fifth Amendment school interrogation cases.125 
                                                                                                                      
121 See id.; Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1369; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 584. The Ferguson test is 
only applicable in public schools because, absent an agency relationship, only public em-
ployees are subject to constitutional limitations. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828 (2002); Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
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Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th 1981), and United States v. Gomez, 614 F.2d 643, 645 (9th 
Cir. 1979), with Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85. 
123 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84–85; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, 
659. All three cases use a balancing test approach, considering factors such as the scope of 
the privacy intrusion of the drug tests, the reasons for conducting the tests, and with whom 
the results were shared. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84–85; Vernonia, 
515 U.S. at 658, 659. 
124 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85. 
125 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, 
659, 660. Neither Vernonia nor Earls cites Ferguson. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Ferguson, 
532 U.S. at 84–85; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, 659. All three cases, however, rely on the same 
factors as emphasized in Ferguson. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84–
85; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, 659. Additionally, Earls cites heavily to Vernonia, which was an 
extremely similar case; Vernonia affirms drug-testing of athletes and Earls affirms drug-
testing of students in any extracurricular activities. See generally Earls, 536 U.S. 822. Thus, 
the Earls Court may not have needed to address Ferguson, which found an adult drug-
testing program unconstitutional. See id. at 830; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86. 
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A. School Drug Testing Cases and the Importance of the Intent of the Actor, 
Whether Evidence Is Sought Out, and with Whom Evidence Is Shared 
 The Supreme Court has found two different school drug testing 
programs constitutional.126 In Vernonia, the Court upheld a program 
that required all middle and high school students to submit to random 
drug testing as a prerequisite to participating in school-sponsored ath-
letics.127 A few years later, in Earls, the Court upheld another school dis-
trict’s similar program that required students participating in any ex-
tracurricular activity to submit to random drug testing.128 In both deci-
sions, the Court found it significant that the tests were conducted to 
help students who were using drugs, not to catch and punish users.129 
Further, both school districts used the test results only to exclude cer-
tain students from extracurricular activities, not for school discipline, 
and neither school district shared the test results with any law enforce-
ment agency or other third-party.130 This benevolent motivation of the 
school officials and lack of criminal punishment are the type of consid-
erations factored into the Ferguson test.131 
 In Vernonia, the Vernonia School District implemented a policy 
that required all student-athletes to submit to random drug testing as a 
condition of participating in school athletics.132 The Supreme Court 
used a search balancing test and held that the policy was constitu-
tional.133 Preliminarily, the Court found that public school officials are 
state actors who are constrained by the Fourth Amendment, although 
they are not held to as high standards of suspicion as law enforcement 
because of the special circumstances of schools and their responsibility 
to maintain order and safety.134 In the first part of the balancing test, 
the Court found that students do have an expectation of privacy even 
in school, but that the expectation is lessened because of the compet-
                                                                                                                      
126 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 839; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 666. 
127 See 515 U.S. at 650. 
128 See 536 U.S. at 825. 
129 See id. at 833, 834, 839; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, 666. 
130 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834, 839; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, 666. 
131 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834, 839; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–
85 (2001); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, 660. 
132 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650. 
133 See id. at 652, 666. In such balancing cases, the court balances the degree of privacy 
of the individual searched against the governmental interest in the searching program. See 
id. at 658–61; Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66 (1989); Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989). 
134 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) 
(noting that searches conducted by school officials do not require probable cause, but 
must be reasonable under all the circumstances). 
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ing responsibilities that schools have in maintaining order and safety in 
the educational setting.135 In addition, student-athletes have an even 
lesser expectation of privacy because they are subjected to preseason 
medical exams and must change and shower in communal locker 
rooms.136 The Court balanced this lessened privacy interest with the 
governmental interest in detecting and discouraging drug use among 
students, and particularly student-athletes who would be more prone to 
injuries because of the mix of drugs and physical activity.137 
 The Court emphasized the concern for student well-being by the 
fact that the test results were only used to encourage the student to get 
treatment and were never turned over to law enforcement or even used 
for any type of school sanction.138 The only sanction for a positive test 
was an immediate re-test; if the second test also came up positive, the 
school would call a meeting of the student, her parents, and the princi-
pal.139 At the meeting, the student would be given the option of par-
ticipating in a six-week treatment program or a suspension from all ath-
letics for the current and following seasons.140 The Court again empha-
sized the focus on treatment in the testing program, when it noted, 
“[T]he search here is undertaken for prophylactic and distinctly non-
punitive purposes.”141 The high governmental interest balanced with 
the limited intrusion of a urine test and the students’ lessened expecta-
tion of privacy led the Court to find the testing program constitu-
tional.142 
 Likewise, in Earls, the Court emphasized the intent of the actors 
and use of test results (or lack thereof) in finding a policy requiring 
students who participated in any extracurricular activity to submit to 
drug testing constitutional.143 Again, the Court balanced the degree of 
invasion of students’ privacy with the governmental interest in main-
taining the health, safety, and discipline of students.144 These govern-
mental interests were separate from a crime control interest because 
                                                                                                                      
135 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656. 
136 See id. at 657. 
137 See id. at 661. The Court also found that, in the Vernonia school district, student-
athletes were seen as the leaders of the school and thus discouraging drug use among these 
students would have a trickle down effect on the rest of the student body. See id. at 663. 
138 See id. at 658. 
139 Id. at 651. 
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142 See id. at 664–65. 
143 See 536 U.S. 822, 825, 833–34 (2002). 
144 See id at 830–31. 
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the testing program was “not in any way related to the conduct of 
criminal investigations.”145 Test results were never used for school dis-
cipline or academic consequences nor turned over to law enforcement, 
which demonstrates the distinct governmental interests of student 
health and safety and general drug law enforcement.146 
 As in Vernonia, the only consequence of a positive drug test in Earls 
was a meeting between the student, her parents, and the principal and 
possible suspension from extracurricular activities.147 Because the test-
ing policy applied to all extracurricular activities, not just athletics, the 
school district (and the Court) could no longer justify the policy by re-
lying upon the special safety and health dangers to athletes engaging in 
drug use and physical activity.148 Instead, the Court focused upon stu-
dents’ somewhat lessened expectation of privacy in school and upon 
the school and governmental interest in curbing drug use among stu-
dents.149 Justice Breyer’s concurrence highlighted this reasoning, not-
ing that the policy’s focus on treatment, counseling, “and avoiding the 
use of criminal or disciplinary sanctions” were significant factors in 
finding that the policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment.150 
 Thus, in both of the school drug testing cases upon which the 
Supreme Court has ruled, it has relied, in part, upon the fact that nei-
ther policy utilized external criminal sanctions.151 Neither school dis-
trict turned the drug test results over to law enforcement though they 
would likely have led to criminal sanctions.152 Furthermore, neither 
policy even provided for school sanctions, such as suspension or ex-
pulsion from the school, which might normally be associated with 
                                                                                                                      
145 See id. at 829. 
146 See id. at 833–34. 
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continue to participate in extracurricular activities if she entered drug counseling; upon a 
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149 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 834, 838. 
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drug use or possession on school property.153 The only possible pun-
ishments were exclusion from the student’s extracurricular activity, 
and even this could be avoided if the student entered a drug counsel-
ing or treatment program.154 The Court’s reliance upon school offi-
cials’ motivation to help students end their own drug use, rather than 
a motive of general drug law enforcement, as demonstrated by the 
lack of criminal and school sanctions, has an important consequence 
for other scenarios in which the Court must balance school-related 
constitutional concerns.155 When constitutional rights are implicated 
in school policies (as the Fourth Amendment was in the school drug 
testing cases or the Fifth Amendment in school interrogation cases), 
courts are unlikely to find an actionable constitutional violation if 
there is no involvement of the criminal justice system.156 The converse 
is also true: courts are more likely to find an actionable in-school con-
stitutional violation if the outcome of the alleged violation includes 
involvement of the criminal justice system (which in turn raises the 
constitutional issues in the proper forum, with available remedies, 
such as use of the exclusionary rule).157 
 The Vernonia and Earls decisions are consistent with Ferguson, de-
spite the fact that, in Fergsuon, the testing program was unconstitu-
tional.158 In Vernonia and Earls, the students’ test results were only used 
to encourage students to get help, or alternatively, to bar them from 
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157 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 
(2001); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, 666. 
158 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84–85; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658, 666. 
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participating in sports or other extracurricular activities.159 The results 
were not used for school sanctions, such as suspensions or expulsion, 
nor were they turned over to law enforcement for criminal sanctions.160 
This use (or non-use) of the drug test results bolsters the fact that the 
school officials were not acting with the intent to assist law enforce-
ment, unlike the hospital staff in Ferguson.161 Continuing the Ferguson 
analysis, in Vernonia and Earls, the school officials did not have a general 
interest in crime control since the test results were never used for 
school or criminal sanctions.162 Put another way, the school officials’ 
immediate goal and ultimate goal were the same—to discourage drug 
use among students.163 This is unlike the situation in Ferguson, where 
the hospital staff’s immediate goal was to assist law enforcement by col-
lecting and turning over evidence of drug use, even if their ultimate 
goal was to deter drug use by pregnant women.164 In both Vernonia and 
Earls, the Court applied factors similar to those in the Ferguson test, and 
the reasoning and methods of analysis were similar, producing a consis-
tent methodology, even though the school testing programs were con-
stitutional and the hospital drug testing program was unconstitu-
tional.165 
B. From the Fourth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment 
 Ferguson, Vernonia, and Earls underscore the importance of the in-
tent of the actor to assist (or not assist) law enforcement and whether 
any evidence is turned over to law enforcement in evaluating if there 
has been a Fourth Amendment violation.166 Ferguson, however, extended 
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informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” See id. at 340. The Court went on to 
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duct a school-based search. See id. at 341. The Court’s concern about impeding a school in-
vestigation even when there was a criminal law infraction is interesting, though, because it 
suggests that the Court, by referring to “disciplinary procedures,” expected even a school 
investigation into a criminal law matter to only result in school punishment, not criminal 
sanctions. See id. at 340. Even T.L.O., while allowing school officials more flexibility than po-
lice in conducting school searches, still reflects the same concern as in Vernonia, Earls, and 
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this analysis beyond just the scope of the Fourth Amendment and the 
drug testing policy in that case.167 Ferguson suggested that its analysis ex-
tended to Fifth Amendment rights as well, noting that “when [public 
hospital employees] undertake to obtain such evidence from their pa-
tients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, they have a spe-
cial obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about 
their constitutional rights, as standards of knowing waiver require.”168 
Because the Ferguson test is applicable in Fifth Amendment cases, and 
the Court considered and based its reasoning on similar factors in the 
Fourth Amendment school cases, the Ferguson test should also be appli-
cable in school cases that involve the Fifth Amendment.169 
 Because of the similar method of reasoning and consideration of 
factors in the analysis, it is likely that the student drug testing policies 
would have been unconstitutional if the test results had been turned 
over to law enforcement, putting the students, like the pregnant women 
in Ferguson, in the way of criminal sanctions.170 This would likely be true 
even if the level of involvement between the schools and law enforce-
ment was not as great as in Ferguson.171 The degree of collaboration be-
tween the hospital staff and law enforcement was not a defining charac-
teristic; instead, it was important as a demonstration of the hospital 
staff’s intent to assist law enforcement.172 Similarly, if the motivation 
behind the school drug testing policies was to curb general crime con-
trol or catch suspected drugs users, as shown by more emphasis on 
criminal sanctions and school discipline than on counseling and treat-
ment, the policies would likely have been found unconstitutional.173 
The reasoning in Vernonia and Earls support this conclusion because 
both decisions emphasized the nonpunitive uses of the drug tests.174 
Thus, by analogy to a Fifth Amendment school case, if a school official 
questions a student with a purpose of general crime control and intent 
to turn any evidence, such as written statements, over to law enforce-
                                                                                                                      
Ferguson about what will be done with the results of the search (or drug test)—will they be 
revealed to law enforcement or not? See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Verno-
nia, 515 U.S. at 658; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
167 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85. 
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172 See id. at 82–83, 85. 
173 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84–85; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658. 
174 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658. 
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ment, then the Ferguson test requires school officials to warn students of 
their constitutional rights, which in this case means Miranda warnings.175 
C. The Ferguson Test in Action in Paradigmatic School Interrogation Cases 
 Return to the scenario that opened this Note, taken from State v. 
Tinkham, a 1998 New Hampshire case.176 A public high school student, 
the defendant, sold some marijuana to a fellow student, who was caught 
with the drugs and turned in the seller.177 The principal then took the 
drugs to the local police department and told the police she planned to 
question the defendant as soon as she returned to school.178 The prin-
cipal called the defendant to her office, explained she believed he had 
drugs, and asked to search his book bag.179 He acquiesced to the 
search.180 The principal found more marijuana and told the defendant 
she would turn the drugs over to the police.181 The principal ques-
tioned the defendant regarding his sale of drugs to another student 
and he confessed, both orally and in writing, to selling drugs on a stu-
dent-referral form.182 The principal then suspended the student for five 
days, told him further action would be taken, and then contacted the 
police, giving them the defendant’s written statement and the drugs 
from his backpack.183 The defendant was charged with selling mari-
juana to another student on school property and moved to suppress 
the written statement and the drugs.184 The trial court denied both mo-
tions, the defendant was convicted, and the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and upheld the 
conviction on appeal.185 
 The court ruled that the principal was not required to give Miranda 
warnings before questioning the defendant because the principal was 
neither a law enforcement officer nor functioning as an agent of law 
                                                                                                                      
175 See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833, 834; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84–85; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658. 
176 See 719 A.2d 580, 581 (N.H. 1998). Tinkham was decided before the Ferguson deci-
sion; nevertheless, Tinkham is a typical school interrogation case that shows how Ferguson 
would apply in such cases. See id. Tinkham involves a Fourth Amendment search issue and a 
Fifth Amendment confession issue, as do many of the school interrogation cases. See id. at 
583; see also cases cited supra note 21. 
177 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. 
182 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
183 See id. at 582. 
184 See id. 
185 See id. at 582, 584. 
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enforcement.186 In determining that the principal was not a law en-
forcement officer, the court relied upon the fact that school officials 
are not trained to conduct police investigations and that school offi-
cials’ mission is to create safe and healthy learning environments, not 
to enforce the law.187 The court acknowledged that if the principal had 
been acting as an agent of law enforcement, Miranda warnings would 
have been required.188 Yet, because the principal approached the po-
lice and they did not direct or advise the principal in her course of ac-
tion, the principal had not been an agent of police.189 Furthermore, 
the intentions of the principal were irrelevant to the analysis—the prin-
cipal’s clear intention to turn evidence over to law enforcement did not 
transform her into an agent.190 Since the principal was neither a law 
enforcement officer, nor an agent of law enforcement, she was not re-
quired to give Miranda warnings.191 
 If the Ferguson test had been applied to Tinkham, the defendant 
still might have been convicted, but by requiring Miranda warnings, the 
Ferguson test would change the process and ensure that the defendant 
was aware of and given an opportunity to exercise his Fifth Amendment 
rights.192 The Ferguson test requires non-law enforcement actors to give 
constitutional warnings if they are seeking out and collecting evidence 
for incriminating purposes and with the intent to turn that evidence 
over to law enforcement.193 In Tinkham, the principal’s intention to 
turn evidence over to law enforcement was clear—she had contacted 
the local police and told them as much, as well as telling the defendant 
further action would be taken.194 Moreover, she was intending to assist 
law enforcement before she questioned the defendant and obtained his 
written confession.195 The principal did not inadvertently acquire the 
confession in the course of a school discipline situation and then turn 
it over to police.196 Instead, she sought to obtain evidence from the de-
fendant “for the specific purpose of incriminating [that student],” 
                                                                                                                      
186 See id. at 583, 584. 
187 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 583. 
188 See id. at 583, 584. 
189 See id. at 584. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. 
192 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001). 
193 See id. 
194 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 582. 
195 See id. at 581. 
196 See id. 
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much like how the hospital staff sought to obtain incriminating evi-
dence against their pregnant patients in Ferguson.197 
 Put another way, although the principal’s ultimate goal may have 
been to prevent drug use and drug sales on her campus, the principal’s 
immediate goal was to “generate evidence for law enforcement purposes” 
demonstrated by her immediate efforts to contact the police and turn 
evidence over to them.198 As much as this distinction between ultimate 
and immediate goals mattered in the context of hospital drug tests, it 
also matters in school interrogation cases.199 It is interesting that the 
New Hampshire court noted that a principal’s primary mission was not 
to enforce the law, even though school officials are responsible for dis-
cipline within the school, which can include inquiries into violations of 
both school rules and criminal law.200 That is precisely the lesson of Fer-
guson—patients (or students) do not expect their doctors (or princi-
pals) to be law enforcement officers nor collect evidence as does law 
enforcement.201 And if non-law enforcement actors are going to act like 
law enforcement and collect evidence with the intent to turn any col-
lected evidence over to law enforcement, the subjects of the inquiries 
ought to receive fair warning.202 
 Under a Ferguson analysis, the principal should have given the de-
fendant Miranda warnings, much as the Supreme Court said that the 
hospital personnel should have given constitutional warnings to their 
pregnant patients.203 If the principal failed to do so, the defendant’s 
statement would likely be inadmissible because of the exclusionary 
                                                                                                                      
197 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
198 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
199 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
200 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 583. 
201 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
202 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; see also State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634, 640 (N.H. 2001). 
In the Heirtzler case, a typical school interrogation case with an atypical outcome, the court 
found an agency relationship between law enforcement and school officials. 789 A.2d at 
641. The local police department had assigned an officer to the high school because the 
police believed that school officials had been handling matters that should have been in-
vestigated by the police. Id. at 636. The school police officer and the principal had a “silent 
understanding” that allowed the officer to pass information to the school officials about 
possible criminal activity on school grounds in order for the school officials to investigate 
and “gather evidence otherwise inaccessible [to the officer] due to constitutional re-
straints.” Id. at 637. In finding an agency relationship, the court said that students “must be 
protected against school officials who inadvertently assume the role of law enforcement.” 
See id. at 640. This is what the Ferguson test seeks to do. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85. 
203 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
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rule.204 In turn, without the confession, perhaps the defendant would 
have been found not guilty.205 Similarly, if the principal had given the 
defendant Miranda warnings, the defendant still may have confessed 
and subsequently still been found guilty.206 Whatever the outcome, ap-
plication of the Ferguson test to this situation, or any school interroga-
tion, would uphold the integrity of the confession and resulting crimi-
nal justice process and ensure that the student-defendant was fully in-
formed of his “precious” right against self-incrimination.207 
 In a similar Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Snyder, a principal 
was not required to give Miranda warnings to a student because the 
principal was not acting as an agent of the police.208 In Snyder, a student 
told a teacher she had seen the defendant with marijuana, and in turn, 
the teacher reported the information to the principal.209 The principal 
located the defendant in the crowded student center during lunchtime 
but, because she did not want to arouse suspicion, she waited until the 
beginning of the next class period to search the defendant’s locker and 
to question the defendant.210 After finding drugs in the defendant’s 
book bag, the principal and vice principal questioned the defendant in 
the principal’s office.211 The defendant then admitted he had offered 
to sell marijuana in school.212 After follow-up questions, the principal 
called the defendant’s mother while another school official called the 
police, in accordance with a school policy to turn any drugs found on 
school property over to law enforcement.213 After an officer came to 
the school, the principal repeated what the defendant had admitted.214 
                                                                                                                      
204 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. Mapp v. Ohio held that the 
admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution was inadmissible in state 
court. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). An earlier case had held unconstitutionally obtained evi-
dence inadmissible in federal court. Id. at 654. The theory behind this concept, known as 
the exclusionary rule, is that suppression of evidence is the best (and really, only) deter-
rent for government officials to adhere to constitutional mandates in criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions because civil actions for damages and criminal prosecutions against 
governmental officials are either ineffective or not pursued. Id. at 652 & n.7. 
205 See Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581. 
206 See id. 
207 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Tinkham, 719 A.2d at 581; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966) (“These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after 
centuries of persecution and struggle.”). 
208 See 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992). 
209 See id. at 1364. 
210 See id. at 1365. 
211 See id. 
212 See id. 
213 See Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1365. 
214 See id. 
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Then, the police officer read the defendant his Miranda rights, and the 
defendant confirmed his prior admission.215 The defendant was even-
tually charged and found guilty of three drug-related offenses and sen-
tenced to two years in jail.216 
 Because the principal had not been acting as an agent of police, 
the principal was not required to give Miranda warnings (nor would any 
other private citizen) to the defendant before questioning him.217 The 
fact that the principal had every intention of turning over any evidence 
she obtained to the police did not change the Massachusetts court’s 
analysis.218 As in Tinkham, the Ferguson test would have required the 
principal to give the defendant Miranda warnings before questioning 
him.219 Given the school policy of turning any confiscated drugs over to 
police, after the principal had found drugs in the defendant’s book 
bag, she knew that any statements the defendant made during her 
questioning would also be given to the police.220 
 Furthermore, the principal’s conduct during the investigation 
seemed less like a school official inadvertently coming across evidence 
while ensuring the safety and order of her building and more like a law 
enforcement officer seeking to generate evidence for criminal sanc-
tions.221 The principal did not want to arouse suspicion, so she post-
poned searching and questioning the student even after the possible 
school and criminal drug violation was brought to her attention.222 This 
behavior seems more designed to obtain the maximum amount of evi-
dence, which the principal knew would be turned over to police, per 
school policy.223 Even after the police officer arrived, the principal as-
sisted in the interrogation, repeating the incriminating statements the 
defendant had made to her in the presence of the police officer, which 
may have influenced the defendant’s decision to confirm the confes-
sion even though he had now been given Miranda warnings.224 The 
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1365. 
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principal’s very deliberate actions throughout the incident indicate that 
her immediate goal was to generate evidence, even if her ultimate goal 
was to maintain the safety of her school building.225 If her immediate 
goal was the safety of the school building, she should have searched 
and questioned the student right away, rather than wait so as not to 
arouse suspicion.226 Either way, the principal’s actions met the Ferguson 
test—she sought to generate evidence with the intent to turn the evi-
dence over to law enforcement—and thus she should have given the 
student Miranda warnings.227 
 As in the analysis of Tinkham under a Ferguson test standard, 
whether or not the defendant is convicted in a case like Snyder may not 
change.228 Perhaps, if given Miranda warnings, the defendant would 
have confessed anyway, leading to a conviction.229 Perhaps he would 
not have confessed, but there still would have been enough other evi-
dence to convict him.230 Perhaps, if the principal had not given the de-
fendant Miranda warnings, even if she were required to, the statements 
may have been suppressed—which could have led to a not guilty ver-
dict.231 In choosing a jurisprudence to evaluate school interrogation 
cases, the emphasis should not be on the eventual outcome, but on a 
process that protects student-defendants and informs them of their 
Fifth Amendment rights in situations where their school officials are 
seeking out evidence to be used not just in school disciplinary proceed-
ings, but in criminal proceedings.232 
                                                                                                                      
vide those warnings. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 603 (2004). In Seibert, a prior 
non-warned statement tainted a later statement made after the provision of Miranda warn-
ings. See id. at 603. The two confessions were separated by a brief twenty-minute break and 
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229 See Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1363. 
230 See id. 
231 See id. 
232 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1365. Both 
Tinkham and Snyder involved students accused of possessing and selling drugs on school 
property. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d at 1363; State v. Tinkham, 719 A.2d 580 (N.H. 1998). Although 
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III. External Support for Applying the Ferguson Test in 
School Interrogation Cases 
 When school officials act with the intent to assist law enforcement, 
as demonstrated by collecting evidence and turning that evidence over 
to police and by analyzing the school officials’ immediate and ultimate 
goals (general crime control, assisting law enforcement, or separate 
school-related ends), the Ferguson test would require that school offi-
cials give constitutional warnings.233 Although the Ferguson test is a fact-
specific inquiry based on each case and their attendant circumstances, 
a general trend exists towards a close collaboration among school offi-
cials and law enforcement, which bolsters the inference that school of-
ficials’ immediate goals are often to assist law enforcement, even if the 
ultimate goal is enforcement of school rules.234 Furthermore, a close 
connection between school officials and law enforcement is frequently 
mandated by school district policies requiring school officials to turn 
evidence over to law enforcement, and statistics reflect a growing in-
crease of schools reporting crime to law enforcement.235 
                                                                                                                      
this is a common situation in which school interrogation cases arise, it is not the only type of 
situation. See In re Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV91000058, 901 P.2d 1247, 1248 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1995). In In re Navajo County, a student confessed to his principal of setting a fire in a 
school locker. Id. The student-defendant moved to suppress the confession because the prin-
cipal had not given him Miranda warnings before the questioning. See id. The court denied 
the motion and the student was later convicted. See id. In upholding the trial court, the appel-
late court cited extensively from the Snyder decision. See id. at 1249. The court wrote that the 
school principal was not a law enforcement agent and was not acting as an agent of law en-
forcement, and thus was not required to give the student-defendant Miranda warnings. See id. 
233 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85. 
234 See Jill F. DeVoe et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Indicators of School 
Crime and Safety: 2005, at 26, 27, 28, (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/iscs05.pdf. 
235 See, e.g., Hayward (Wis.) Community School District, Student Interrogation/Interview 
Policy (2002), http://www.hayward.k12.wi.us/BOE/Web%20policies/400%20Policies/445. 
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rogations, Searches, and Arrests (2004), http://www.jeffcodir.jeffco.k12.co.us/board/poli- 
cies/regs/jih-r.html [hereinafter Jefferson County Policy]; Jonesport (Me.) Public Schools, 
Student Interrogations, Searches, and Arrests (2003), http://www.union103.org/JnsptPoli- 
cies/JIH.htm [hereinafter Jonesport Policy]; Knox County Board of Education, Interroga-
tions and Searches (2004), http://www.kcs.k12tn.net/policy/j/jcab.pdf [hereinafter Knox 
County Policy]; Las Cruces (N.M.) Public Schools, Regulation, Student Interrogations, 
Searches, and Arrests (2005), http://www.lcps.k12.nm.us/Committees/Policies/Series_J/ 
JIH_Interrogation_Searches_Arrests.doc [hereinafter Las Cruces Policy] & http://www. 
lcps.k12.nm.us/Committees/Policies/Series_J/JIH_RA_Student_Interrog_Search.doc [here-
inafter Las Cruces Regulation]; York (Me.) School Department, Student Interrogations 
and Searches Procedures (2003), http://www.yorkschools.org/policies/J%20-%20Students/ 
S008B91F5-008B91F5?DF0=0. Many of the policies are identical and seem to be based on 
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A. School Policies Concerning Student Interrogations 
 Many school districts have policies that both allow principals to 
interrogate students without giving constitutional warnings and require 
that principals turn over any evidence of a crime to law enforcement.236 
A typical policy is that of the Las Cruces (New Mexico) Public Schools 
which provides that when a student is a suspect or accused of a crime, 
“a principal may interview the student, without the presence of parents, 
and without giving the student constitutional warnings, if breach of 
school discipline, health or safety of the student or the student body, or 
presence in the school building or grounds or illegal matter is in-
volved.”237 These broad areas in which a student may be interrogated 
without warnings will cover almost any infraction, from a minor viola-
tion of school rules to a serious felony.238 Importantly, this broad appli-
cation covers the set of circumstances with which the Ferguson test is 
concerned—situations in which the school official is acting to assist law 
enforcement and turn evidence over to law enforcement.239 The policy 
goes on to require school officials to report evidence of “any felony, or 
distribution or possession of any amount of drugs” to law enforce-
ment.240 Additionally, school officials are instructed to “cooperate with 
[any] law enforcement agency and not withhold information which the 
agency deems relevant to its investigation.”241 This sounds remarkably 
similar to the unconstitutional policy in Ferguson which was “designed to 
obtain evidence of criminal conduct by the tested patients that would 
be turned over to the police and could be admissible in subsequent 
criminal prosecutions.”242 
 Thus, in Las Cruces public schools, a student could be interro-
gated by a school official, with that school official having every inten-
tion to assist law enforcement without giving the student Miranda warn-
ings.243 Notably, if a school official calls a law enforcement officer to the 
school to conduct the very same interrogation about the same incident, 
the law enforcement officer would be constitutionally required to give 
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Association, homepage, http://www.nsba.org (last visited Mar 20, 2007). 
236 See Las Cruces Regulation, supra note 235, at 5. 
237 See id. 
238 See id. 
239 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85. 
240 See Las Cruces Policy, supra note 235, at 1, 3. 
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242 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86. 
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the student Miranda warnings.244 Applying the Ferguson test, the princi-
pal would be required to give Miranda (or similar) constitutional warn-
ings because the school official is acting for the purpose of and with the 
intent to assist law enforcement, by collecting incriminating evidence 
against the student while knowing she would turn that evidence over to 
law enforcement as required by district policy.245 
 Many school policies have similar requirements that school officials 
turn evidence of certain crimes (often specifying drug-related incidents) 
over to law enforcement and allow school officials to question students 
for any reason without notifying the students’ parents or guardian or 
giving any constitutional warnings regarding the right to silence and an 
attorney.246 Interestingly, many school policies require the exact oppo-
site when law enforcement officials conduct investigations on school 
premises.247 When law enforcement agents (as opposed to school offi-
cials) conduct an interrogation, many policies require school officials to 
notify a student’s parents or guardian, require that the parents be pre-
sent during the interrogation, or require a parent to give consent before 
an interrogation is conducted on school grounds.248 The differing 
stance of treatment of interrogations by school officials and law en-
forcement suggests that school officials recognize the gravity of a law 
enforcement interrogation.249 Some school districts even require their 
school administrators to apprise law enforcement of any disabilities or 
limitations of an interviewed student.250 
 School districts take differing views on whose responsibility it is to 
assure compliance with constitutional mandates during law enforce-
ment interrogations.251 Some districts expect the law enforcement offi-
                                                                                                                      
244 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
245 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85; Las Cruces Policy, supra note 235, at 1, 5; see also Com-
monwealth v. Snyder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 n.9 (Mass. 1992) (noting that, though it seemed 
unlikely that the court would require school officials to give students Miranda rights in all 
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246 See sources cited supra note 235. 
247 See Hayward Policy, supra note 235; Jefferson County Policy, supra note 235. 
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251 See sources cited supra note 235. 
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cers to self-govern, while others instruct their respective school officials 
to ensure that the law enforcement officers apprise the student of her 
Miranda rights.252 The Jonesport (Maine) School District policy is atypi-
cal in that it mandates its school officials to take an active role in pro-
tecting students’ constitutional rights.253 The policy states, “[I]t is the 
responsibility of the school administration to assure that the legal rights 
of students are not violated” during the school day or during school-
sponsored activities, and further directs school officials to protect stu-
dents from coercion or illegal restraint during law enforcement inter-
rogations.254 School districts’ imposition of additional safeguards dur-
ing law enforcement interrogations, given the serious consequences of 
such questioning, is incongruous with the policies’ specific exemption 
of school personnel from giving constitutional warnings during inter-
rogations with school officials even though a confession to a school of-
ficial can just as easily lead to serious consequences in the criminal jus-
tice system.255 
B. School Crime and Reporting Statistics 
 Even as the occurrence of crimes at schools has been declining, 
schools are reporting more crimes to law enforcement, which reflects 
an increasingly close collaboration between school officials and law en-
forcement.256 More urban schools and schools with higher minority 
enrollments report more crimes to law enforcement.257 This suggests a 
disparate impact upon urban and minority students of student confes-
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sions as an entry into the criminal justice system.258 Both the close con-
nection between schools and law enforcement and the unequal report-
ing rates demonstrate the need for the Ferguson test to establish uniform 
standards since school officials often knowingly intend to share evidence 
with law enforcement, a situation of which students should be fully in-
formed.259 
 Between 1992 and 2003, overall youth crime declined by approxi-
mately half, both at school and away from school, while during the 
same time period, schools reporting at least one crime to law enforce-
ment rose from 57% to 63%.260 Breaking this figure down by type of 
crime, 36% of schools reported a violent crime (including 15% of a 
serious violent crime), 28% reported a theft, and 52% reported other 
crimes.261 The incidence of crimes and of crimes reported to police is 
not uniform across different urbanicities, however.262 In all three re-
porting categories, city schools had a higher incidence of crime and 
higher reporting levels to police.263 For example, the overall violent 
crime report rate was 36%, although 44% of city schools reported a vio-
lent crime to police, while only 35% of urban fringe, 40% of town, and 
29% of rural schools reported a violent crime to police.264 The pattern 
is similar in the other categories—city schools report rates higher than 
the overall figure, followed in decreasing order by town, urban fringe, 
and rural.265 The higher reporting rates for city schools suggests that 
                                                                                                                      
258 See id. 
259 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 85 (2001); DeVoe et al., supra note 
234, at 28. 
260 DeVoe et al., supra note 234, at iv. “At school” includes crimes that took place in 
school buildings, on school grounds, or on school buses during normal school hours or dur-
ing school-sponsored events or activities. See id. at 29. Regarding “at school” incidents, in 
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261 DeVoe et al., supra note 234, at 27. Serious violent crime includes rape, sexual bat-
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262 See id. at 29. As might be expected, incidents and reports of crimes in all four cate-
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263 DeVoe et al., supra note 234, at 28. 
264 Id. at 29. 
265 Id. The overall report rate for theft was 29%: 34% for city schools, 28% for urban 
fringe schools, 30% for town schools, and 24% for rural schools. Id. For “other crimes” the 
overall rate was 52%: 61% for urban schools, 49% for urban fringe, 55% for town schools, 
and 47% for rural schools. Id. 
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more students in those schools are likely to find themselves in a situa-
tion where the Ferguson test would be applicable.266 
 Schools’ reports of crimes to police also vary depending on the 
percentage of minority enrollment.267 Schools with the highest minor-
ity enrollments have the highest rates of reporting crime to police.268 
The overall report rate for violent incidents was 36%, but for schools 
with a minority enrollment of 75% or more, the report rate for violent 
crime was 45%.269 For schools with minority enrollment of less than 
10%, the report rate was 31%; for schools with minority enrollment of 
10 to 24%, the report rate was 36%; for schools with minority enroll-
ment of 25 to 50%, the report rate was 37%; and for schools with a 
minority enrollment of 50 to 74%, the report rate was 39%.270 Again, 
the same trend exists in the subset of serious violent crime and in the 
“other incidents” categories.271 The trend was less significant in the 
theft category, where the schools with the lowest minority enrollment 
had a report rate of 27% and schools with the highest minority en-
rollment had a report rate of 31%.272 
 These statistics suggest a frequent sharing of information and evi-
dence of crimes between many schools and law enforcement, indicat-
ing a need for the Ferguson test.273 Furthermore, the statistics demon-
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strate that urban and minority students are more likely to be ques-
tioned about an incident the principal knows she is going to relate to 
the police as evidence than their urban fringe, town, rural, and non-
minority counterparts.274 This disparity also highlights the need for the 
Ferguson test because a uniform, predictable standard would help en-
sure that students are equally apprised of their constitutional rights, 
which is particularly necessary given that not all student confessions are 
equally likely to result in referral to the criminal justice system.275 Thus, 
in situations in which it is applicable, the Ferguson test would protect 
and inform rural and urban as well as minority and non-minority stu-
dents alike.276 
IV. The Realities and Practicalities of the Ferguson Test in 
the School Interrogation Setting 
A. Custodial Interrogation 
 Assuming a situation in which the Ferguson test triggers constitu-
tional warnings, traditionally, Miranda warnings are only required when 
the recipient of the warnings is both (1) interrogated and (2) in cus-
tody.277 Interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement of a 
suspect, meaning that someone the police are focusing on as a poten-
tial defendant, not just as a witness.278 When a school official questions 
a student in a Ferguson-triggering situation, the “interrogation” compo-
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3, 2005) (transcript on file with author), http://www.wnyc.org/news/articles/46748. In 
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278 See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
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nent is met.279 By requiring that the school official seek out evidence 
with the intent to turn that evidence to law enforcement, the Ferguson 
test ensures that the questioning is initiated by a school official and that 
the school official is focused on gathering evidence against a particular 
student.280 Furthermore, interrogation for Miranda purposes also cov-
ers conduct or questioning that law enforcement knows is reasonably 
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.281 This so-
called “functional equivalent” of interrogation also includes considera-
tion of any suspect’s particular susceptibilities or vulnerabilities that law 
enforcement is aware of to use in eliciting a statement from the sus-
pect.282 In a Ferguson situation, the functional equivalent of interroga-
tion is often easily met because of the special relationship between a 
school official and a student. A school official is not only likely to per-
sonally know the student she is interrogating and the student’s back-
ground (including any particular susceptibilities), but a school official 
also has access to the student’s entire educational file, which contains 
much more than just grades.283 
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 What constitutes custody is a more tricky analysis.284 A formal ar-
rest can meet the custody requirement, but this would not be the case 
in a school-based Ferguson situation.285 However, “restraint on freedom 
of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest” also meets 
the custody requirement.286 The latter definition of custody is evaluated 
with a reasonable person test: would a reasonable person in the sus-
pect’s position, given the totality of the circumstances, have felt free to 
end the questioning and leave?287 The location of the interrogation is 
not determinative because even some interrogations that have taken 
place in police stations have been found to be non-custodial since the 
suspects went to the station voluntarily and were not prevented from 
leaving.288 On the other hand, the Supreme Court held that an inter-
rogation in a suspect’s home was custodial because it took place in the 
middle of the night, with the suspect surrounded by police officers with 
guns drawn.289 
 A student, of course, does not go to the principal’s office voluntar-
ily, in any true meaning of the word.290 The student must go see the 
principal and, once in the office, is not free to “end the questioning 
and leave.”291 Although a student might be insolent and difficult by re-
fusing to answer questions, this is not the same as feeling free to leave 
the principal’s office.292 In a Ferguson situation, a student would not be 
surrounded by police who can use force or the threat of force to pre-
vent her from leaving the principal’s office, but the power dynamic be-
tween a student and her principal, who has the ability to threaten and 
impose school punishments, effectively functions as restraint on a stu-
dent’s freedom of movement.293 After all, being summoned to the 
principal’s office certainly carries with it “inherently compelling pres-
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earned; and video tape recordings of individual or groups of students. See Nat’l Ctr. for 
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292 See id. 
293 See Orozco, 394 U.S. at 325. 
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sures which . . . compel [the student] to speak where he would not oth-
erwise do so freely.”294 Additionally, in some schools, a school security 
guard, who may or may not be a law enforcement officer, may retrieve a 
student from class and accompany that student to the principal’s office, 
further demonstrating that the student is not voluntarily going nor free 
to end the questioning, but rather is made to go by a show of authority 
and a potential use of force.295 
 In at least one case, a court found a custodial setting in a princi-
pal’s office.296 In In re Killitz, the student-defendant was summoned to 
the principal’s office, waited outside for a few minutes, and then was 
brought into the office.297 In the principal’s office, a police officer 
questioned the student while the principal watched.298 The court found 
that the student was in custody during the questioning because the stu-
dent was “obliged” to respond to a school administrator’s request to go 
to the principal’s office, and had not gone voluntarily.299 Further, the 
court found that the student was in school during regular school hours, 
such that school officials controlled this student’s (and all other stu-
dents’) freedom of movement “a great deal.”300 Additionally, neither 
the police officer nor the principal did anything “to dispel the clear im-
pression communicated to defendant that he was not free to leave.”301 
The court concluded that the student was in custody, under a state stan-
dard very similar to the federal Miranda custody test.302 
 In re Killitz is distinguishable from most school interrogation cases 
(and from the school interrogation cases addressed in this Note) be-
cause a law enforcement officer conducted the interrogation.303 How-
ever, the Colorado court’s analysis on the issue of custody is instructive 
and applicable to more routine school interrogation situations that do 
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not involve law enforcement.304 The court affirmed that a student does 
not go to the principal’s office voluntarily and, once in the office, is not 
free to leave, two important factors in the custody analysis.305 There-
fore, the custody element is often met when a student is questioned by 
school officials.306 
B. The Substance of the Ferguson Rule Warnings 
 Because the traditional Miranda requirements of custodial interro-
gation are met in a school interrogation by a school official, and be-
cause school officials often have an intent (frequently dictated by 
school policy or custom) to turn the results of an interrogation over to 
police, Miranda warnings should be given to students in these types of 
interrogation settings.307 Ferguson stated that the hospital employees 
should have warned patients of “their constitutional rights, as standards 
of knowing waiver require,” and similarly, school officials should warn 
their students in comparable situations.308 For ease of application, 
school officials can follow their respective state laws concerning minors 
and Miranda warnings.309 
 Some states have special requirements when administering Miranda 
rights to minors, and in such a jurisdiction, school officials should also 
follow these rules.310 For example, some states require the presence of 
or an opportunity for the minor to discuss the Miranda warnings with an 
“interested adult,” while others require a simplified version of Miranda 
for minors.311 The Miranda court stated that an “accused must be ade-
quately and effectively apprised of his rights” in order to permit a full 
opportunity for the accused to exercise his or her right against self in-
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crimination.312 Therefore, in a school interrogation, an adequate warn-
ing of a student’s rights should require the school official to make it 
clear that any information obtained will be shared with law enforcement 
for potential criminal punishments, not just for in-school punishments, 
since this is the crux of why a school official would even be giving such 
warnings.313 Such specific warnings are not unheard of—New Hamp-
shire specifically requires informing a minor that she may be sent into 
the adult system in its Miranda warnings for minors.314 
C. Feasibility 
 The Ferguson test will not require constitutional warnings in every 
school discipline situation because the factors of the test will not be met 
in every situation.315 The Ferguson test and its factors limit the applica-
bility to situations in which school officials are seeking out evidence 
against a student with the intent to turn that evidence over to law en-
forcement.316 School functioning will not be impaired because of the 
Ferguson test or by requiring school officials to sometimes give Miranda 
warnings, as concerned the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Com-
monwealth v. Dingfelt, which wrote: 
 School officials do stand in the position of loco parentis 
and as such are entitled to retain a degree of control over the 
school’s students and its environment. For these reasons they 
should not be limited to the degree that would result in mak-
ing it necessary to warn students of their constitutional rights 
everytime [sic] a problem of discipline arose and especially 
when the problem of discipline occasions the knowledge of 
the commission of the crime. It would be utterly ridiculous for 
a teacher who confronted a student for throwing a rubber 
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band across the classroom to be under a duty to give Miranda 
warnings before telling the student to empty his pockets.317 
The Supreme Court enunciated a similar concern when considering if 
school officials were required to get a warrant before searching a stu-
dent in New Jersey v. T.L.O.318 The Court wrote that a warrant require-
ment was “unsuited” to the school environment because it would inter-
fere with school officials’ ability to swiftly implement disciplinary pro-
cedures needed in the school setting. 319 The Ferguson test and its 
factors, however, distinguish routine classroom discipline situations 
from interrogations by administrators who are intending to turn in-
criminating evidence over to law enforcement based on official or de 
facto school policies.320 The Ferguson test would not require constitu-
tional warnings in the former, only in the latter.321 
 As the Pennsylvania court worried, if every teacher in every disci-
plinary situation, had to give Miranda warnings, classroom discipline 
would halt, chaos would reign, and learning would cease.322 But the 
line is much clearer than the Pennsylvania court admits; school officials 
would be required to give warnings when they intend to turn evidence 
over to police, based upon the nature of the incident and school poli-
cies.323 A classroom teacher instructing her student to hand over the 
student’s cache of rubber bands, or even questioning the student about 
his rubber band “possession,” is a disciplinary situation that is very 
unlikely to reach law enforcement, and thus would not meet the Fergu-
son test.324 
 Similarly, most in-classroom discipline situations will not meet the 
Ferguson test.325 Even those situations that begin in the classroom but 
eventually include sending a student to the administration for further 
action will usually not meet the Ferguson test because so many of these 
incidents are not of the sort that could or would be turned over to law 
enforcement.326 For example, thirty percent of middle schools and 
twenty-nine percent of high schools report at least weekly incidents of 
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“student acts of disrespect for teachers,” and these are likely handled 
and punished within the classroom by the classroom teacher.327 When 
students causing an act of disrespect are referred to a school adminis-
trator, such incidents are not the kind where a principal would interro-
gate a student with the intent to turn any information gathered over to 
police, even if the student “confessed” to disrespecting her teacher in a 
written student-referral form.328 
 On the other hand, a situation in which a principal is investigating 
a student suspected of having drugs on school property and questions 
that student with every intention of turning any evidence (such as a 
written confession) over to the police would meet the Ferguson test.329 
Already existing school policies also provide guidance as to when there 
is a Ferguson situation, and thus school officials should give Miranda 
warnings.330 For example, the Las Cruces policy mandates that school 
officials report and turn any evidence of a felony or drug-related crimes 
to local law enforcement.331 Likewise, the Hayward policy encourages 
school officials to report and share evidence of tobacco use and re-
quires school officials to report and share evidence of alcohol use or 
possession with local law enforcement.332 Thus, in these districts, teach-
ers and (most likely) principals know that if they are questioning a stu-
dent about an alcohol or drug incident, they need to give warnings be-
cause they intend (and indeed, are required) to turn any evidence over 
to law enforcement.333 Thus, even though the number of incidents 
where school officials call, inform, or assist law enforcement is rising, 
the Ferguson test will not have any impact on most individual, routine 
discipline situations.334 
Conclusion 
 In Miranda, the Supreme Court wrote, “[This decision] was neces-
sary . . . to insure that what was proclaimed in the Constitution had not 
become but a ‘form of words’ in the hands of government officials.”335 
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The Ferguson test would ensure that a student is informed of her consti-
tutional rights before an interrogation if her principal is seeking out 
evidence with the intent to turn that evidence over to law enforcement. 
Applying the Ferguson test to school interrogations would ensure a 
process more appropriately protective of students’ Fifth Amendment 
rights than agency law, which is how school interrogation cases have 
usually been analyzed. The Ferguson test is the more appropriate analy-
sis because, although Ferguson and other school search cases rely on 
similar analyses, Ferguson extends to other constitutional rights. 
 The Ferguson test, which would provide a uniform guideline for 
school officials conducting student interrogations, is particularly neces-
sary for several reasons. First, there is an increasingly close connection 
between many school officials and law enforcement due to policies that 
require school officials to share evidence of certain potential criminal 
activity with law enforcement. Next, statistics show that students in ur-
ban schools and schools with high numbers of minority students report 
more crimes to police, suggesting that some students may be more vul-
nerable in school interrogation situations. Finally, because students do 
not expect their principals to seek out evidence the same way they 
would expect of law enforcement, they may give a statement that they 
believe will be used solely for school disciplinary purposes, though it 
turns out to be used for matters of criminal justice—a situation that, if 
known by the student, may have changed their decision to speak. Thus 
the Ferguson test is necessary because it would ensure that students’ 
Fifth Amendment rights do not become “but a form of words” in the 
hands of school officials. 
